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Erimc oF STATUTES ABOLSHING SEALS OR MAKIG
THEM UNNECESSARY.-In several of the States, moreover, the rules affecting" sealed instruments generally have been more or less modified by statute. Thus in Minnesota where the statute provides that "the use of private seals on written contracts is hereby abolished, and the addition of a private seal to an instrument in writing shall not, affect its character in any respect,' it was held that all the, differences theretofore existing in the law between sealed and unsealed instruments were abolished and that notwithstanding the presence of a seal, an undisclosed principal could be ,charged upon parol evidence of his existence. ' On the other hand, in Texas, where the statute declares that no, private seal shall be necessary to the validity of any contract, bond or conveyance, "nor shall'the addition or omiscion of a seal or scroll in any way affect the force and effect o the sdme," it was held that this statute had not changed the rule.
1 ORo (R. S. 1 4 1zo).-No deed of real estate executed by any person acting for another, under a power of attorney duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, shall be held to be invalid or defective because he is named therein, as such attorney. as the grantor instead of his principal; nor because his name. as such attorney, is subscribed thereto, instead of the name of the principal; nor because the certificate of acknowledgwent, instead.of setting forth that the deed was acknowledged by the principal, by bin sttorney, sets forth that it was acknowledged by te person who executed It, as such attorney; but all such deeds so executed shall be as, valid and effutual, in all respects. within the authority conferred by such powers of attorney, as if they had been executed by the principals of such attorneys, in their own proper persona.
PzxNsY.VAxxA (Purdon's Digest of Stat.. 13th ed.. p. 376, 3 8).-Whenever any deed of conveyance or other instrument of writing has been heretofore executed or acknowledged, or both under any power sufficiently authorizing the same, which power shall have been recited in said deed or other Instrument, shall have been informally executed by an attorney. in his own name. feciting his authority, instead of being executed in the name of the principal or principals, such deed or instrument shall he taken to be of the same validity and effect as if executed in the name and behalf of the principal or prin. cipals. as a p2riy or parties thereunto.
Tatzxxssh (Shan. Code. 3 3679).-Instruments in relation to real or personal prop. erty, executed by an agent or attorney, may be signed by such agent or attorney for his principal, or by writing the name of the principal bi him as agent or attorney, or-by simply writing hts own name or his principal's name, if the instrument on its face shows the character in which it iz intended to be executed.
See McCreary v. MeCorkle (Tenn. Ch.). 54 S. W. 53. V&&otwia (Code. I z 4 z6).-If, in a deed made by one as attorney in fact for another, the words of conveyance or the signature be in the name of'the attorney, it shall be to much the principal's deed as if the words of conveyance or the siguature were In the name of the principal by the attorney, if It be manifest on the face of the deed that it should be construed to be that of the principal to give effect to its intent.
WaLT VIAtZIRA (Ch. 71. 3).-If in a deed made by one as attorney in 'fact for another, the words of conveyance or the signature be in the name of the attorney, It shall be as much the principars deed as If the words of conveyance or the signature were in the name of the principal by the attorney, if it be manifest on the face of the deed that it should be construed to be that of the principal to give effect to its intent 9 Strecter v. Janu. go lna. -Whether the rule excluding parol evidence to charge the real principal should apply where the contract though happening to be under seal, was not one to whose validity'a seal was essential, is a question upon which the authorities are not entirely uniform. It is held in some cases that the evidence is as admissible under such ,circumstances as though no seal were in fact attached;" but in other cases it is held that the rule of exclusion applies unless the interest of the principal appears upon the face of the contract or unless the principal has ratified it and accepted the benefits of it." § 7. INSTRUMENT MAY BIND NEITHER PRINCIPAL NOR AGENT.
-It does not necessarily follow, of course, that either the principal or the agent must always be bound upon the instrument. It may be so executed that neither will be bound. Thus, if the covenants are clearly the covenants of the principal, but the agent signs in his own name, and appends his own seal, neither the principal nor the agent will ordinarily be liable upon the instrument: the principal, because he has not signed, and the agent, because he has not covenanted.1 For similar reasons, the reverse of the situation will be subject to the sapie rule, that is, where the grants and covenants are dearly those of the agent only, but the signature and seal are those of the principal." 4 In general, as will be seen hereafter, the agent-cannot be liable upon the instrument itself unless it contains apt words to bind him personally; though" in many cases, as will be seen, he will be liable upon an express or implied warranty of authority. Courts have, however, in several cases declared that, ut res agis twleat. quan peeRal, they would, where the principal could not be held, lean towards a construction which would make the agent ,personally liable." § 8. HeinOnline --6 Mich. L. Rev. 555 1907 Rev. 555 -1908 effect as such and will not support the agreement of the other party to pay the purchase price or rent fherein provided for." 6 Where, however, the covenant though made by the. agent, is that the prin-,cipal will convey, such a covenant is valid and furnishes a good consideration for the agreement of the opposite party to pay.
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But though the instrument may be invalid as a conveyance, the agent may be liable upon any of the covenants contained in it, which may subsist without a transfer of the title.
18
The agent's personal covenant in such a .case may, it is held, operate by way of estoppel to prevent the agent's setting up 4 subsequently acquired title to the same premises, " but he is not estopped by covenants made in the principal's name. 20 § 9. How QUESTION DEraMINzD.-In determining whether the deed is the deed of the principal, regard may be had, First, to .the *party named. as grantor. Is the deed stated to be made by the principal or by some other person? Secondly, to the granting clause. Is the principal or the agent the person who purports to make the grant? Thirdly, to the covenants, if any. Are these the covenants of the principal? Fourthly, to the testimonium clause. Who is it -who is to set his name and seal in testimony of the grant? Is it the principal or the agent? And Fifthly, to the signature and seal. Whose signature and seal'are these? Are they those of the principal or of the agent?
If updn such an analysis the deed does not upon. its face purport to be the deed of the principal, made, signed, sealed and delivered in his name and as his deed, it cannot take effect as such. § 10. SAME SUBJECT-NOT ENOUGH THAT THE AGENT IS DEscRIBED AS SucH.-It is not enough that -the agent was in fact authorized to make the deed, if he has not acted in the -name of the principal. Nor is it sufficient that he describes himself in the deed as acting by virtue of a power of attorney or otherwise, for, or in behalf, or as attorney, of the principal, or as a committee, dr as trustee of a corporation, etc.; for these expressions are but descriplio persond, and if in fact he has acted in his own name and set his own hand and seal, the causes of action theren accrue to and 'against him personally and not to or against the principal, despite these recitals.2 2 But at the same time, no set form of words is necessary. The deed must be in the name, and purpolt to be the act and deed, of the principal; but whether such is the purport of the instrument, must be determined from its general tenor, and not from any particular clause. Such construction must be given, in this as well as in other questions arising on conveyances, as shall make every parL of the instrument operative as far as possible; and when the intention of the parties can be discovered, such intention should be carried into effect, if it can be done consistently with the rules of law.
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Thus in a leading English case, it is said by GROSF, J.: "There is no particular form of words required to be used, provided the act be in the name of the principal, for where is the difference between signing J. B. by M. W., his attorney, which must be admitted to be good, and M. W. for J. B? In either case, the act of sealing and delivering is done in the name of the principal and by his authority. Whether the attorney put his name first or last cannot affect the validity of the act done." 2 The particular illustration used here, however, is not a very happy one; because, as will be seen,2u the form "M. W. for J. B." is not always free from difficulty. § 11. S^A SuBjFr-IuusT'rAToNs.-Thus where a deed was executed by an agent in the following form, "Know all men, etc., that I, Josiah Little, of, etc., by virtue of a vote of the Pejebscot Proprietors, passed, etc., authorizing and appointing me to give and execute deeds for and in behalf of said proprietors, for and in consideraion of the sum of thirty-seven pounds to me in hand paid by Thomas Stinchfield. of, etc., the receipt whereof I do hereby acknowledge, have given, granted, released, conveyed and confirmed unto him, the said Thomas Stinchfield, his heirs and assigns, two hundred acres, etc. To have and to hold, etc., hereby covenanting in behalf of said proprietors, their respective heirs, executors and administrators, to and with the said T. S., his heirs and assigns, to warrant, confirm and defend him and them in the possession of the said granted premises, against the lawful claims of all persons whatsoever. In testimony that this instrument shall be forever hereafter acknowledged by the said proprietors as their act and deed and be held good and valid by them, I, the said Josiah Little, by virtue of the aforesaid vote, do hereby set my hand and seal this day, etc." Signed "Josiah Little, Seal," it was held to be the deed of Josiah Little and that he, and not the Pejebscot Proprietors, was liable upon the covenans.2S So where Jonathan Elwell executed to Joshua Elwell a power of attorney to convey the lands in question, and the latter, purporting to act in pursuance of it, executed a deed of the land, in which, after reciting the power, he proceeded: "Now know ye that I, the said Joshua, by virtue of the power'aforesaid, in consideration, etc., do hereby bargain, grant, sell and convey unto the said (grantees) to have and to hold, etc., and I do covenant with the said (grantees) that I am duly empowered to make the grant and conveyance aforesaid; that the said Jonathan at the time of executing said power was, and now is, lawfully seized of the premises, and that he will warrant and defend the same, etc. 'In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set the name and seal of the said Jonathan this day, etc.," and signed "Joshua Elwell" and seal, the deed w.s held not to be the deed of Jonathan.
2 ' § 12. And again where one of two deeds which purported to be made by "New England Silk Company, a corporation, by Christopher Colt, Jun., their treasurer," was attested: "In witness whereof, I, the said Christopher Colt, Jun., in behalf of said company, and as their treasurer, have hereunto set my hand and seal," was signed and sealed "Christopher Colt, Jun., treasurer, New England Silk Com-pany," and the acknowledgment was to the effect that "Christopher Colt, Jun., treasurer, etc., acknowledged the above instrument to be his free act and deed," and the other deed was like the first except that Colt was therein described as "treasurer of New England Silk Company, and duly authorized for that purpose," the court held each of them to be inoperative to convey the title of the Silk Connpany. In both of these deeds, as will be noticed, the principal was properly named as grantor but they were signed add sealed by the agent in his own name. "Both of these deeds," said Judge MzrcALP, "were executed by C. Colt, Jun., in his own name, were sealed with his seal, and' were acknowledged by him as his acts and deeds. In one of them, it is -true, he declared that he acted in behalf of the company, and as their treasurer; and in the other he declared himself to be their treasurer, and to be duly authorized for the purpose oi executing it.-But this Was not enough. He should have executed the deeds in the name of the company. He should also have affixed to them the seal of the company, and have acknowledged them to be the deeds of the company."I T - § r3. Where, however, although the agent was named in the instrument as the party, the deed was properly signed in the name of the principal, it was given effect as the deed of the principal, and not of the.agent.2 8 In this case a lease was made commencing as follows: "This indenture, made this 17th day of April, A. D. z869, between Daniel R. Brant, of the city of Chicago, party of the first part, and Edward F. Lawrence, president of the Northwestern Distilling Company, of the same place, party of the sec'ond part." Throughout the lease the parties were spoken of as persons and the covenants were personal covenants, and the instrument concluded 2(s follows: "In testimony whereof, the said parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written. Magill to make a deed of the real estate of the company, and he, in pursuance of the authority, executed a deed, of which the granting part was as follows: "Arthur W. Magill, agent for the Middletown Manlfacturing Company, being empowerei by vote," etc., "for and in behalf of said company," etc., "do give, grant," etc., the covenant being: "I do hereby covenant for and in behalf of said company," etc. "that said Middletown Manufacturing Company is well seized," etc., And again, where the terms 'of the conveyance were: "I, Daniel King, as well for myself as attorney for Zachariah King, do for myself and the said Zachariah, remise, release and forevir quitclaim" the premises, "together with all the estate, right, title, inter,.s*t, use, property, claim and demand whatsoever, of me, the said Daniel, and said Zacha ian, which we now have, or heretofore had at any time, in said premises. And we, the said Daniel and Zachariah, do hereby, for ourselves, our heirs and executors, covenant that the premises are free of all incumbrance and that the grantee may quietly enjoy the same without any claim or hindrance from us or any one claiming under us, or either of us. In witness whereof, we the saidDaniel for himself and as attorney aforesaid, have hereunto set our hands and seals," etc., and signed "Daniel King" and "Daniel King, attorney for Zachariah King, being duly authorized as appears of record," with seals affixed to each signature, it was held that the grant con~leyed the title of both." PFzsoNAz-Where the covenants are clearLy personal, the mere addition of the word "agent," ':trustee," etc.; will not, as has been stated, change their character. Thus where a bond was executed by certain persons, who signed and sealed the same as individuals, but added "Trustees of the Baptist Society of the Town of Richfield," the court said: "The bond must be considered as given by the defendants in their individual capacities. It il not the bond of the JBaptist church; and if the defendants are not bound the church certainly is not, for the church has not contracted either in its corporate name or by its seal The addition of 'Trustees' to the names of the defendants is, in this case, a mere descriptio personcarum."."
And for the same reason, where A., B., C. and others, "trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Jacksonville, their successors and assigns," executed a bond, binding themselves, their heirs, executors and administrators, and signed it in their individual names, they were held personally liable.3 5 § 17. So, where a contract to convey recited that it was made between W. of the first part and F., president of the second part, and was signed and sealed "F., Pres. ation; and that the corporation could not sue on the instrument in its own name." So, where a lease-under seal describes the lessor as "H. B., agent of M. L.," and it is signed "H. B., agent," with his seal, the words "he" and "his" being used in all the terms and covenants, naming the party of the first part, a declaration in the name of M. L. is bad, on demurrer.$? § i8. SAME SUBJ3CT-WUAT FoRM SuFFmCET.-Where a lease purporting to be made by Mussey, was signed "John Hammond for B. B. Mussey, (Seal)" it was held that it was well executed as the lease of Mussey. Said the court: "The defendant does not deny Ha.amond's authority, but takes the ground that the lease is not the deed of Mussey but of tammond. And the common learning is relied on, to wit, that when a deed is executed by attor-'ney, it must be the act of the principal, done and executed in the principal's name. The only question is, What is an execution of a deed, by an attorney, in the name of the principal? We understand the execution of a deed to be the signing, sealing and delivery of it. These must be done in the name of the principal by the hand of the attorney. When the signing and sealing are in the name of the principal, the delivery will be presumed to have been so, unless the contrary is proved. But however clearly the body of the deed may show an intent that it shall be the act of the principal, yet unless it is executed by his attorney for him, it is not his deed, but the deed of the attorney or of -no one: Wilks' (Seal). The. court of King's bench decided that the deed was well executed in the.name of Browne. This decision has never been overruled, but has always been regarded as rightly made.""0 § 19. So where the operative clauses of a deed were in the name of the corporation "by William Wallace, their agent," and the covenants were in the name of the corporation, but.the signature was "William Wallace, Agent for the Flower Brook Manufacturing Company," the court held that the deed must be considered the deed of the corporation. 1 And wherr a contract under seal was made "between the C. I. Co. party of the first part by J. S. B. agent, and J. K. B. and E. C. B.,. parties of the second part ;" the stipulations in the contract purporting to be between "the said party of the first part" and "the said parties of the second part," no names being given, and concluded, "In witness whereof the parties have hereunto affixed their hands and seals," and was signed "J.
," it was held to be the deed of the company."2 § 20. In the cases cited in the two precedtng sections it will be noticed that the respective instruments purported to be made by and in the name of the principal. But where a bond beginning "I promise to pay," etc., and not mentioning any obligor's name, was signed, "Witness my band and seal, H. S. Lucas, (Seal) for Charles Callender," the Supreme Court of North Carolina held Lucas personally responsible." And so where a bond was signed "Thomas Dix, acting for James Dix," Chief Justice .RuPIN said it was .Iunquestionably the bond of Thomas and not of James. The former seals it and he speaks in it throughout, and the latter not at all.""" But the same judge in pasging upon the liability of a party to tion has been iiade in the case of public agents. who have entered into agreements. imt negotiable, for the performance of public duties. In such a case it i. to be presume(' that they did not undertake personally to assume the public burdens, and although they may have entered into covenants rider seal, partaking of a personal nature, yet where the obligation i.; known to be a public one, they can only be held p.rsonall) bound, if at all, where the intent is clearly apparent so to bind them. " Said Chief Justice MARSHALL: "The intent of the officer to bind himself personally, must be very apparent indeed to induce such a construction of tht; contract ;"1+ and it is said by another learned judge that, "It is much against public policy to cast the obligations that justly belong to the body politic upon this class of officials."" These cases, however, are not to be confounded with the cases where the agents, like the trustees and officers of private corporations and religious bodies, are not public in their nature, nor with cases of negotiable instruments, which stand upon different ground.
§ 22. WHVITIIEit N.ECESSARY THAr DEED SHOULD PURPORT TO BE ExF.CUTED B .. X AGrNT.-Whether it is necessary to the validity of the deed that it should on its face purport to be executed by an agent. or whether the agent may act in the principal's-name throughout with nothing to disclose the fact of the agency, are qtestions which have been much discussed.
Thus In Wood v. Goodridge the agent had executed a mortgage by simply signing the name of his principal with nothing to show that it was signed by an agent and not by the principal in person. FETCHER, J., was of the opinion that such a form of execution was not-authorized, and said --Rtdc of WIood v. Goodridg.-"It should appear upon the face of the instruments that they were executed by the attorney, and in virtue of the authority delegated to him for this purpose. It is not enough that an attorney in fact has.authority, but it must appear by the instruments themselves which he executes, that he intends to execute this authority. The instruments should be made by the attorney expressly as such attorney; and the exercise of his delegated authority should be distinctly avowed upon the instruments themselves. Whatever may be the secret intent and purpose of the attorney, or whatever may be his oral declaration or profession at the time, he does not in fact execute the instruments as attorney, and in the exercise of his power as attorney, unless it is so expressed in the instruments. The instruments must speak for themelves. Though the attorney should intend a deed to be the deed of his principal, yet it will not be the deed of the principal, unless the instrument purports on its face to be his deed. The authority gven clearly is, that the attorney shall execute the deed as attorney but in the name of the principal."" The decision in the case, however, was placed upon other grounds.
How of this Rule.-This rule, certainly, has much to commend it, as tending to the due and orderly execution of important instruments, and as facilitating greatly the proper preservation in the public records of the evidence of the authority and of its exercise. But at most, it was a mere dictum in the case, and its authority has not generally been conceded, even in its own State. 50 § 23. SAME SUBJE6T.-FURTHER OF THIS 3 s speaking of this case, RicE, J., said: "No case, I apprehend, can be found in the books which will sustain the -rule so broadly laid down by the learned judge in the case of Wood v. Goodridge. Nor can the doctrine be sustained on principle. It is difficult to p6rceive an) sound reason why, if one man may authorize another to act for him and bind him, he may not authorize him thus to act for and bind him in one name as well as in another. As matter of convenience in preserving testimony, it may be well that the names of all the parties who are in any way connected with a written instrument should appear upon the instruments themselves. But the fact that the name of the agent by whom the signature of the principal is affixed to an instrument, appears upon the'instrunient itself, neither proves nor has any tendency to prove, the authority of such agent. That must be established aliunde, whether his name appears as agent, or whether he simply places the name of his principal to the instrument to be executed." This, however, was the case of a promissory note and not of a deed. Again in Devinney v. Reynolds, s1 a deed commencing: "To all to whom these presents shall come, Know ye that Michael Hollman by WIlIam McAllister, his lawful and regularly deputed attorney in fact, etc., grants," etc., concluded, "In witness whereof, the said Michael Hollman, by his attorney aforesaid. hath hereunto set his hand and seal," etc. To this were appended the name and seal of Michael Hollman. Said the court: "The execution of the deed is in proper form, and, indeed, we seldom see such instruments executed so much in accordance with approved precedents. It would be useless to add the name and seal of the attorney, for it is what it purports to be, the deed of the principal and not the attorney, and therefore does not 'equire his name and seal, but the name avd seal of the principal only." § 24. So in Berkey v. Judd t 3 a deed reciting that it was made by the principals by their attorney in fact, was signed and sealed in the names of the principals, followed by the words, "By their attorney in fact." The court said: "As respects the execution of a deed by an attorney in fact, although it is usual and better for him to sign the name of his principal, and to add thereto his own signature, with proper words indicating that the act is done by him as such attorney, yet it is not in all cases necessary that he should so append his own name. When the deed on its face purports to be the indenture of the principal, made by his attorney in fact, therein designated by name, it may be properly executed by such attorney by his sub-.scribing and affixing thereto the name and seal of his principal alone. ' In this case the deed purports on its face to be the indenture of the principals, and not that of the agent. It fully discloses that it was made for them and in their name by their attorney in fact who had full authority so to do. Its execution was properly acknowledged by him as such attorney in fact, and for and on behalf of his said principals. The neglect to sign his own name to the words 'by their attorney in fact' was a purely technical omission devoid of any legal effect whatever." § 25. In both of the cases last cited, however, it will be noticed that the fact that the deed was executed by an agent appeared from the face of the instruments.
In Wilks v. Back, " heretofore referred to, where the signature to the instrument, which v. as an arbitration bond, was: "For James Browne, Mathias Wilks," (Seal), LAWRENCE, J., said: "Here the bond was executed by Wilks for and in the name of his principal; and this is distinctly shown by the manner of making the signature. Not even this was necessary to be shown; for if Wilks had sealed and delivered it in the name of Browne, that would have been enough without stating that he had so done."
Where the deed is to be signed in the presence and by the direction of the principal, mere parol authority is, as has been seen, sufficient,; and in such case there need be nothing in the deed to indicate that the signature was set by an agent and not by the principal.
§ 26. SAME SuJEcT-How IN R-AsoN.-While the rule of Wood v. Goodridge is undoubtedly well founded in convenience and propriety, yet it is difficult in reason to perceive why even in those cases where nothing whatever appears upon the face of the instrument to indicate it, it may not be shown by evidence aliunde that it ivas in fact executed by an agent. It cannot be said that this is to contradict, add to or vary the deed by parol evidence, for its legal effect remains the same, and it is none the less afterward what it purported to be before,-the deed of the principal. Neither can it be said that in one case there .is, while in the other there is not, evidence of the agency. In either event the agency must be proved as a fact. It cannot be established by mere recitals of authority or by any pretence of acting in that capacity. § 27. PAROL EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO DISCHARGt; AGENT.-Where the deed upon its face is the deed of the agent, parol evidence is not admissible to discharge the agent by showing that it was intended or understood to be the hIeed of the principal,50 but where the deed is ambiguous, parol evidence may be resorted to, to show who was in fact the party intended to be charged. 7 
